@@ -132,81 +132,31 @@ macro_rules! define_rust_probestack {
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//
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// The ABI here is that the stack frame size is located in `%rax`. Upon
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// return we're not supposed to modify `%rsp` or `%rax`.
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- //
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- // Any changes to this function should be replicated to the SGX version below.
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- #[ cfg( all(
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- target_arch = "x86_64" ,
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- not( all( target_env = "sgx" , target_vendor = "fortanix" ) )
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- ) ) ]
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+ #[ cfg( target_arch = "x86_64" ) ]
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#[ unsafe( naked) ]
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#[ rustc_std_internal_symbol]
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pub unsafe extern "C" fn __rust_probestack ( ) {
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- core:: arch:: naked_asm!(
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- "
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- .cfi_startproc
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- pushq %rbp
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- .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
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- .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
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- movq %rsp, %rbp
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- .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
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-
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- mov %rax,%r11 // duplicate %rax as we're clobbering %r11
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+ #[ cfg( not( all( target_env = "sgx" , target_vendor = "fortanix" ) ) ) ]
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+ macro_rules! ret {
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+ ( ) => {
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+ "ret"
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+ } ;
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+ }
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- // Main loop, taken in one page increments. We're decrementing rsp by
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- // a page each time until there's less than a page remaining. We're
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- // guaranteed that this function isn't called unless there's more than a
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- // page needed.
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- //
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- // Note that we're also testing against `8(%rsp)` to account for the 8
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- // bytes pushed on the stack orginally with our return address. Using
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- // `8(%rsp)` simulates us testing the stack pointer in the caller's
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- // context.
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-
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- // It's usually called when %rax >= 0x1000, but that's not always true.
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- // Dynamic stack allocation, which is needed to implement unsized
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- // rvalues, triggers stackprobe even if %rax < 0x1000.
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- // Thus we have to check %r11 first to avoid segfault.
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- cmp $0x1000,%r11
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- jna 3f
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- 2:
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- sub $0x1000,%rsp
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- test %rsp,8(%rsp)
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- sub $0x1000,%r11
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- cmp $0x1000,%r11
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- ja 2b
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-
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- 3:
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- // Finish up the last remaining stack space requested, getting the last
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- // bits out of r11
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- sub %r11,%rsp
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- test %rsp,8(%rsp)
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-
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- // Restore the stack pointer to what it previously was when entering
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- // this function. The caller will readjust the stack pointer after we
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- // return.
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- add %rax,%rsp
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-
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- leave
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- .cfi_def_cfa_register %rsp
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- .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
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- ret
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- .cfi_endproc
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- " ,
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- options( att_syntax)
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- )
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- }
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+ #[ cfg( all( target_env = "sgx" , target_vendor = "fortanix" ) ) ]
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+ macro_rules! ret {
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+ // for this target, [manually patch for LVI].
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+ //
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+ // [manually patch for LVI]: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-load-value-injection#specialinstructions
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+ ( ) => {
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+ "
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+ pop %r11
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+ lfence
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+ jmp *%r11
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+ "
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+ } ;
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+ }
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- // This function is the same as above, except that some instructions are
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- // [manually patched for LVI].
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- //
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- // [manually patched for LVI]: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-load-value-injection#specialinstructions
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- #[ cfg( all(
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- target_arch = "x86_64" ,
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- all( target_env = "sgx" , target_vendor = "fortanix" )
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- ) ) ]
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- #[ unsafe( naked) ]
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- #[ no_mangle]
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- pub unsafe extern "C" fn __rust_probestack ( ) {
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core:: arch:: naked_asm!(
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"
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.cfi_startproc
@@ -255,9 +205,9 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn __rust_probestack() {
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leave
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.cfi_def_cfa_register %rsp
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.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
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- pop %r11
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- lfence
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- jmp *%r11
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+ " ,
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+ ret! ( ) ,
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+ "
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.cfi_endproc
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" ,
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options( att_syntax)
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