publish the security advisory

Author: pietroalbini

posts/2020-07-14-crates-io-security-advisory.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+---
+layout: post
+title: crates.io security advisory
+author: Rust Security Response WG
+---
+
+This is a cross-post of [the official security advisory][ml]. The official post
+contains a signed version with our PGP key, as well.
+
+---
+
+The Rust Security Response Working Group was recently notified of a security
+issue affecting token generation in the [crates.io] web application, and while
+investigated that issue we discovered an additional vulnerability affecting
+crates.io API tokens.
+
+We have no evidence of this being exploited in the wild, but out of an
+abundance of caution we opted to revoke all existing API keys. You can generate
+a new one at [crates.io/me].
+
+## Overview
+
+Until recently, API keys for [crates.io] were generated using the PostgreSQL
+random function, which is not a cryptographically secure random number
+generator. This means that in theory, an attacker could observe enough random
+values to determine the internal state of the random number generator, and use
+this information to determine previously created API keys up to the last
+database server reboot.
+
+As part of the investigation for this, we also found that API keys were being
+stored in plain text. This would mean if our database were somehow compromised
+the attacker would be have API access for all current tokens.
+
+## Mitigations
+
+We deployed a code change to production to use a cryptographically secure
+random number generator, and we implemented hashing for storing tokens in the
+database.
+
+Exploiting either issue would be incredibly impractical in practice, and we've
+found no evidence of this being exploited in the wild. However, out of an
+abundance of caution, we've opted to revoke all existing API keys. You can
+generate a new API key by visiting [crates.io/me]. We apologize for any
+inconvenience this causes.
+
+## Acknowledgements
+
+Thanks to [Jacob Hoffman-Andrews] for responsibly disclosing the random number
+generator issue according to [our security policy][policy]. Thanks to [Siân
+Griffin] and [Justin Geibel] from the crates.io team for helping the Security
+Response WG addressing both of the issues. Thanks to [Pietro Albini] from the
+Security Response WG for coordinating the work on this vulnerability.
+
+## Timeline of events
+
+All times are listed in UTC.
+
+- 2020-07-11 17:43 - The issue is reported to [security@rust-lang.org]
+- 2020-07-11 20:56 - The issue is acknowledged, the leads of the crates.io team
+  are looped in
+- 2020-07-11 23:48 - The issue is confirmed and a planned fix is agreed on
+- 2020-07-13 08:00 - The development of the fix is started
+- 2020-07-14 12:53 - The fix is tested on the staging environment
+- 2020-07-14 19:03 - The fix is deployed, existing tokens are revoked, and the
+  issue is disclosed publicly
+
+[ml]: https://groups.google.com/forum/?oldui=1#!topic/rustlang-security-announcements/wc5d_Qq35RA
+[policy]: https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security
+[security@rust-lang.org]: mailto:security@rust-lang.org
+[crates.io]: https://crates.io
+[crates.io/me]: https://crates.io/me
+[Jacob Hoffman-Andrews]: https://github.com/jsha
+[Siân Griffin]: https://github.com/sgrif
+[Justin Geibel]: https://github.com/jtgeibel
+[Pietro Albini]: https://github.com/pietroalbini